Raimon Obiols: Union for the Mediterranean, a clarification is needed
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) has been in the news from the beginning, mainly as a result of the difficulties encountered in launching it. These problems are primarily due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, there are also other intrinsic reasons, which stem from the complicated gestation of the UfM project and from its peculiar strategic conception. A debate is needed to try and clarify two issues: the relationship between the UfM project and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the prospects of developing the UfM project.
It is said that the UfM is paralysed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While this is true, it is not the whole truth. The reality is that its development is intermittent and spasmodic. Its ‘institutions were suspended’, at the request of the Arab countries, in protest at Israel’s armed intervention in Gaza in the winter of 2008. In May 2009 Bernard Kouchner stated that the UfM ‘was blocked’. However, on 25 June an initial ministerial meeting took place in Paris on sustainable development. This was attended, together with their counterparts, by the Israeli Environment Minister, Gilad Erdan, and the Minister for Economic Affairs of the Palestinian Authority, Bassem Khouri. The press highlighted the fairly ‘apolitical’ nature of this meeting, which put the conflict to one side and concentrated on issues of water management, transport and urban development. On 7 July the Finance Ministers of the UfM countries met in Brussels, as too did a committee of High Representatives. The UfM seemed to be emerging from the tunnel and there was no shortage of triumphalist declarations. Henri Guaino told Le Monde: ‘A few months ago, no one would have bet on our chances of successfully holding such a meeting. It is in clear contradiction to those who always want everything to fail. You could say that the UfM has been relaunched’.
However, the relaunch was short-lived. The meeting of Foreign Ministers, convened for the end of November in Istanbul, has been indefinitely postponed. Bernard Kouchner has said: ‘we have given up [on holding the meeting] because the Egyptian minister refused to meet with his Israeli counterpart’. Various diplomatic sources have stated the obvious: the Arab countries have rejected any face-to-face meeting with Avigdor Lieberman.
In the meantime, the launch of the UfM’s structures and projects has been put almost totally on hold. It has been decided to locate the Secretariat in Barcelona, but the appointment of its first Secretary General is still up in the air. There is also discontent (as recently expressed by Belgium) about the co-presidencies running for longer than the six-monthly presidencies of the European Union. Added to this is a certain deterioration in Franco-Egyptian relations. There is a lack of clarity in the definition of projects and the budget forecasts are vague. The books are not balancing. There is a lack of information about the level of commitment and extent of the EIB’s contribution, and Germany has indicated that the UfM cannot benefit from a European budget in addition to that of the Barcelona Process. The public-private partnership clearly depends on the coherence and continuity of the overall project.
This situation is pretty serious. There is such a huge contrast between the proclaimed intentions and the actual results that, if there is no change in direction and methods, exasperated frustration could end up being the only outcome. In fact, since its very conception, the UfM has been faced with one decisive and as yet unanswered question: does its functioning depend on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or should it be developing independently?
In other words: is it reasonable to wait for the conflict to end before developing an ambitious Euro-Mediterranean policy, bearing in mind the importance and urgency of the other Mediterranean problems?
The design of the Euro-Mediterranean policy that emerged from the Barcelona Process (1995) and that was further developed through the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) overcame this dilemma to a large extent. It involved a progressive development process with a broad regional network (via association agreements and action plans between the EU and the various countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean) that guaranteed its continuity. However, the UfM proposal once again established the Near East issue (aggravated by Palestinian divisions and particularly by the Israeli military attack on Gaza) as the decisive and unresolved point of Mediterranean policies.
The reason for this can be found in the contradictory approach of the UfM initiative, which was apparent in all its vicissitudes right from the beginning (problems with Germany, Turkey, etc.). In this respect, a conceptual clarification is needed with regard to the approach, and an eminently practical change is required with regard to the specific method of action.
Nicolas Sarkozy’s design has been highly paradoxical. It involved setting two contradictory objectives at the same time: on the one hand, a ‘depoliticisation’, which stifled the discussion of democratic reforms and human rights in the region and which put all the emphasis on a ‘functionalist’ strategy (a ‘union of projects’), and, on the other hand, a potent ‘institutionalisation’ with its resulting centralisation.
In his speech in Tangiers on the UfM in October 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy evoked the functionalism of Jean Monnet and compared the UfM project with the ECSC project that laid the foundations of the future EU. However, at the same time, institutionalisation at the highest political level was proposed, as was spectacularly highlighted at the launch ceremony in Paris, which led to retrospective criticism due to its pomp.
Functional leadership by officials, experts and ambassadors was replaced with leadership by the Heads of State and Government. This had its advantages, but also its limitations. As stated by Dominique Baudis, President of the Arab World Institute: ‘It was a mistake to launch the Barcelona Process solely at ministerial level. When the initiative is taken at the level of Heads of State and Government, the political impact is greater’. This is no doubt true. However, the vulnerability of the initiative and its dependence on random factors in the political context are correspondingly increased, as demonstrated by the spasmodic and erratic nature of the UfM’s development to date.
In this situation of a worrying impasse in the UfM, some are opting for a leap in the dark and for controversy. This is the case with Henri Guaino, who has written: ‘The Union for the Mediterranean is a battle, which we will conduct to the very end! It is a fair battle and it is a necessary battle. Those responsible for the defeat in Barcelona have no place giving lessons’. A retrospective discussion would be absurd: we have to start from the current situation (launching the UfM with all its difficulties and contradictions). However, we urgently need to discuss the changes and adaptations required to face the future. We have to agree on a specific method of action, in which Guaino-style leaps in the dark are not particularly helpful.
Faced with the need for urgency both in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in the general challenges of the Mediterranean, we must not create a false alternative. It would not be fair or sensible to leave aside the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries: it is indisputable that the Mediterranean policy can only be developed depending on what happens in the Near East. However, we must try to drive forward this development so that the Euro-Mediterranean policy is not paralysed, so that further frustrations are not generated and so that new cooperation projects and instruments can be created in the Mediterranean as a positive contribution to a conflict that the UfM cannot resolve by itself, but that it can help to solve. Progress in future UfM projects is not an obstacle to resolving the conflicts in the Near East; quite the opposite, in fact.
During the first year and a half of the UfM’s development, there has been too much rhetoric and too little professionalism and common sense. Can we overcome this situation? The reality in the Mediterranean demands that we do. The vital relaunch of the UfM must be everyone’s goal, and those who are currently occupying the stage would do well to adopt a more modest attitude and make a greater commitment to clarification and definition.
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La demande de clarification est plus qu’opportune deux jours à peine après la décision de surseoir à la nomination d’un secrétaire général, de ses adjoints et à l’adoption de statuts pour la structure commune devant gérer l’UpM. Tout est renvoyé au début janvier mais il n’est pas sûr que la décision sera plus mûre qu’elle ne l’est en cette fin décembre.
Tout le monde, presque tous – sauf MM. Guaino, Moratinos et Abul Gheit sans doute – ont conscience que l’aventure amorcée le 13 juillet 2008 à Paris a abouti à un enlisement dont personne ne semble vouloir tirer les conséquences politiques. Personne n’oserait le dire ouvertement et les craintes éprouvées par les pays partenaires de s’exprimer franchement ne sont pas illégitimes. Chaque représentant diplomatique a d’abord le devoir de défendre et de promouvoir le dossier, bilatéral, de son pays et ne voudrait pas compromettre cette tâche prioritaire par des critiques qui seraient mal interprétées par une institution communautaire ou par une des capitales européennes.
Il ne s’agit d’ailleurs pas d’incriminer l’un ou l’autre des acteurs, mais de s’obliger à déterminer les raisons de cet aboutissement à l’impasse.
Raimon Obiols a raison de souligner que le contexte moyen-oriental a joué et qu’il n’a pas été le seul facteur de blocage.
La méthode choisie n’est vraisemblablement pas la bonne. Plutôt cavalière, opaque et qui ne tient pas compte des acquis du processus de Barcelone. Ainsi, Paris, Madrid et le Caire ont choisi une forme de coopération inter-gouvernementale qui, implicitement, indique que la volonté n’était pas de corriger les erreurs du processus lancé en 1995, mais de repartir de zéro avec les mêmes handicaps et la même absence de stratégie à long terme.
La parité claironnée à Paris a été fictive. Les trois promoteurs ont graduellement centré le débat, les propositions et les quelques décisions ponctuelles, au sein du cercle restreint de leur « troïka » peu transparente et si peu paritaire. Tous les autres pays peinent à les suivre dans le flou qui caractérise cette « Union de projets » qui n’offre d’autres perspectives que de lancer une coopération qui n’aurait sans doute pas besoin d’être placée dans un tel cadre pompeux et finalement sans consistance. Ni l’énergie, ni le commerce ou la mise en place d’un système de règles d’origine, la coopération entre les PME ou même l’agriculture et le dossier sur les migrations n’avaient besoin de réunions à grand renfort de tambours et trompettes et de dépenses somptuaires. Les accords d’association et les « plans d’action » suffiraient amplement à de tels projets.
Qui oserait prendre la responsabilité d’un éventuel échec ?
Les Etats, membres de l’UE ou de pays partenaires ? Leur attention est prioritairement focalisée sur les bénéfices ponctuels.
L’APEM ? Enlisée elle-même dans la définition de ses méthodes de travail, l’Assemblée parlementaire n’offre pour l’instant qu’une capacité de réaction réduite (un exemple vient d’être donné: deux jours après la nouvelle déclaration européenne sur la Palestine, aucun écho n’est venue de cette institution conjointe qui donne le sentiment d’être préoccupée plus par des marchandages internes plus que du fond). Elle donne d’elle plus l’image d’une instance d’entérinement que de proposition. Sa vocation démocratique serait mieux servie si elle avait l’audace d’avancer des idées à contre courant, d’oser sortir des pistes balisées par les avis de l’institution parlementaire européenne, en se dotant d’une relative vie autonome.
L’Espagne durant le premier semestre 2010 ? Sa présidence de l’UE durant cette période sera déterminante: elle sera celle de la relance sur des bases plus saines ou celle d’un enterrement discret comme ce fut le cas il y a près de 20 ans du Dialogue Euro-Arabe mort par déficit d’objectif et de stratégie crédible. Encore faut-il être sûr que la future co-présidence européenne de l’UpM ne sera pas assurée plutôt par Catherine Ashton que par Miguel Moratinos et après lui son collègue belge. La question n’est pas tranchée du côté européen.
Le plus urgent semble être, non pas de décider de projets ou de réunir des chefs d’Etat, mais d’engager un débat clair, ambitieux et même contradictoire (démocratique) sur les objectifs et les visées à long terme. On l’a répété maintes fois: la coopération euroméditerranéenne porte sur « tout, sauf les institutions ». Celle de l’Union européenne évidemment. Mais peut-être faudra-t-il ouvrir le débat pour savoir quelles institutions spécifiques concevoir si cela s’avèrait utile, à plus ou moins longue perspective.
L’APEM, en particulier, devrait, si elle prouve qu’elle en a la capacité, offrir l’enceinte pour organiser et animer un tel débat profond, en osant remettre en question l’édifice à l’évidence mal équilibré dans ses fondations.
La « pause de réflexion » est-elle possible ? Est-il envisageable de s’arrêter pour réfléchir, pour mieux cibler les objectifs, parfaire les méthodes de travail et de décision et repartir sur de meilleures bases ? Le risque, sinon, serait d’être comme celui qui glisse sur une pente raide. Le danger de perdre l’équilibre et, finalement, de chuter. Ce ne sera alors qu’une nouvelle occasion perdue ?
http://www.medafrique.info/news/show.php?id=1190